Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise by Clemmons, Melanie A.
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
Volume 46, Number 1, 1985
Author v. Parodist: Striking a Compromise
MELANIE A. CLEMMONS*
I. THE PARODY CONFLICT
The treatment of parody' remains one of the most troublesome areas in copy-
right law today. The work of a parodist necessarily depends upon the use of a
preexisting work of authorship for its creation. This dependence brings parody into
conflict with the original author's 2 exclusive right under United States copyright law3
to control certain uses of his work. The parodist takes material' from the work of
authorship being parodied in order to identify that work as the object of his or her own
creative essay, yet the parody adds new matter to the underlying work through the
individual effort of the parodist. This combination of a preexisting work with new
matter results in the creation of a derivative work, which the original author has, in
principle, the exclusive right to prepare under the 1976 Act.5 Without the permission
of the original author to use the original work, a parodist thus may infringe upon the
copyright in the underlying work6 and incur liability under the 1976 Act for actual or
statutory damages. 7 A parodist could even incur criminal liability and risk forfeiture
of his or her parody,8 depending on the court's perception of the parodist's intent to
infringe. The 1976 Act also permits a court to enjoin a parodist from creating or
disseminating his or her parody. 9 Finally, for any unlawful use found of a preexisting
work, the 1976 Act denies a parodist copyright protection of the parody as a de-
rivative work.'o
Despite the legal conclusions that seem to flow from this statutory framework,
the courts have been reluctant to treat parody as copyright infringement. They tend to
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1. The term "parody" is used broadly in this Article to encompass any form of critical or humorous expression
which depends on a preexisting work of authorship for its creation and contains independent effort. A work that might be
called a burlesque, travesty, or pastiche under another definition, for example, is treated as a parody for purposes of this
Article.
2. The terms "original author" and "author" are used interchangeably in this Article to refer to the creator of the
original work of authorship that is being parodied. The original author is presumed to be the copyright owner of the
original work, unless otherwise noted.
3. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101-810 (1976) [hereinafter referred to as the 1976 Act].
4. Historically, the parodist takes the substance, or essence, of the original work in order to create a parody. The
quantity of the original work taken does not determine whether a parody has been created, as long as the image of the
original work is brought to the audience's mind. See infta notes 56-58 and accompanying text.
5. 17 u.S.C. § 106(2) (1976).
6. Id. § 501.
7. Id. § 504.
8. Id. §§ 506, 509. These penalties are not likely to be imposed upon a parodist, however.
9. Id. § 502.
10. Id. § 103(a).
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ignore the issue of consent to parody altogether and attempt to mitigate the legal
disabilities of parodists by treating parody cases under the fair use doctrine. " The fair
use concept developed under the common law 12 and first was codified in section 107
of the 1976 Act, which states four factors to be considered when determining if a
particular use is a fair use.' 3 While the intent of the drafters was that a codified
doctrine of fair use would continue to be interpreted flexibly in order to meet the
varying circumstances that arise, 14 its application to the parody cases has not yielded
satisfactory results.
The courts deciding a number of the well-known parody cases 15 have de-
termined fair use by utilizing the third factor to be considered, "the amount and
substantiality" of the portion of the original work taken,' 6 as a determinative test.' 7
The courts accept the idea that a parodist's substantial or nearly verbatim copying of
1I. The fair use concept was summarized in Loew's, Inc. v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc., 131 F. Supp. 165,
174 (S.D. Cal. 1955), affd sub nom. Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affdper curiam sub na.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43, reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958) as follows:
Fair use may be defined as a privilege in others than the owner of a copyright to use the copyrighted material in a
reasonable manner without his consent, notwithstanding the monopoly granted to the owner by the copyright.
Fair use is technically an infringement of copyright, but is allowed by law on the ground that the appropriation is
reasonable and customary.
Id. (citing H. BALL, LAW OF COPYRtIHT AND LITERARY PROPERTY 260 (1944)) (emphasis added by court). See generally
M. NIMMER, 3 NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 13.05[C] (1984) [hereinafter cited as NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT].
12. The two cases generally recognized as first defining the doctrine of fair use are Folsom v. Marsh. 9 F. Cas. 342,
347-48 (C.C.D. Mass. 1841) (No. 4901) and Lawrence v. Dana, 15 F. Cas. 26, 59-61 (C.C.D. Mass. 1869) (No. 8136).
13. Section 107 reads in full as follows:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, the fair use of a copyrighted work, including such use by
reproduction in copies or phonorecords or by any other means specified by that section, for purposes such as
criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or
research, is not an infringement of copyright. In determining whether the use made of a work in any particular
case is a fair use the factors to be considered shall include-
(1) the purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a commercial nature or is for
nonprofit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copyrighted work.
17 U.S.C. § 107 (1976).
14. H.R. REP. No. 1476, 94th Cong., 2d Sess. 66, reprinted in 1976 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 5659, 5680.
The drafters intended § 107 to be no more than a codification of the existing judicial law of fair use. Id.
15. The early cases dealing with parody include Hill v. Whalen & Martell, Inc., 220 F. 359 (S.D.N.Y. 1914); Green
v. Luby, 177 F. 287 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); Green v. Minzensheimer, 177 F. 286 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1909); and Bloom &
Hamlin v. Nixon, 125 F. 977 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1903). Later cases of particular interest are MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d
180 (2d Cir. 1981); Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184 (5th Cir. 1979); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1132 (1979); Berlin v. E.C.
Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541 (2d Cir.), cert. denied. 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th
Cir. 1956), aff dper curiam sub noam. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43, reh'g denied. 356
U.S. 934 (1958); Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124 (N.D. Ga. 1981); Warner Bros. Inc. v.
American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp. 611 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981); Elsmere Music, Inc.
v. National Broadcasting Co., Inc., 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd. 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980); Metro-Goldwyn-
Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature
Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y. 1975); and Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F.
Supp. 348 (S.D. Cal. 1955).
16. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976).
17. See, e.g., MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981);Wamer Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcast-
ing Co., 654 F.2d 204, 209 (2d Cir. 1981); Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1978):
Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741,744 (S.D.N.Y.), affld 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980);
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods.. Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 359 (N.D. Ga. 1979); Walt
Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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an original work is a taking that exceeds the permissible scope of fair use, 8 but that a
taking of only as much as is necessary to "conjure up" the original work is
allowed. 19 However, no clear criteria are set out for determining exactly how much is
necessary to conjure up the original. Nor is the legal result clear in the case in which a
parodist takes more than is necessary to conjure up the original, but not enough to
constitute substantial copying under the doctrine of Benny v. Loew's, Inc.
20
Certain cases have injected an additional fair use factor into the analysis by
focusing upon a parody's effect on the market for the original work.21 These cases
hold that when the parody does not serve as a substitute in the market for the original
work, fair use can be found if the copying is not substantial.22 This overemphasis on
economic harm is misplaced in copyright law, and provides no magic solution to the
specific problems raised by parody.23 This approach also begs the question of how
much a parody can take and still be regarded a fair use.
The fair use factors, as thus applied, have generated confusion in the law of
parody.24 This confusion, in turn, induces the courts to consider factors that are not
appropriately part of the fair use doctrine in making decisions. 25 The outcome of any
given case often appears to have turned on an individual court's perception of the
particular parody's value to society, weighed against the harm caused by denying the
original author the right to exclusive control of such a use of the underlying work.
The case law thus has developed in a reactionary fashion, with the decisions swinging
back and forth to favor first the author, then the parodist.
26
18. This principle is derived from the Ninth Circuit's holding in Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir.
1956), affdper curiam sub noma. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43, reh'g denied, 356 U.S.
934 (1958).
19. Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955) first introduced
the "conjure up" test, which then was expressly adopted by the Second Circuit in Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329
F.2d 541, 542-43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964).
20. 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affdper curiam sub nom. Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356
U.S. 43, reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958).
21. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1976); see infra note 22.
22. See MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 184 (2d Cir. 1981); Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541,
543 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964); Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., Inc., 523 F. Supp.
611, 617 (S.D.N.Y.), affd. 654 F.2d 204 (2d Cir. 1981); Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods.,
Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 356 (N.D. Ga. 1979).
23. See infra note 34 and accompanying text. See generally infra notes 30-37 and accompanying text.
24. See infra note 26, which traces the zig-zag pattern of the recent parody cases.
25. See for example, MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 182 (2d Cir. 1981), in which the court considers the
obscenity of the work in question; Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 759 (9th Cir. 1978), in which the
court discusses a parodist's First Amendment right to parody; Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v. Showcase Atlanta Cooperative
Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357 (N.D. Ga. 1979), in which the court holds that a parody must serve a critical, as
opposed to a merely humorous, function in order to be protected; and Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co.,
482 F. Supp. 741,746 (S.D.N.Y.). affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980), in which the court discusses the controversy over
whether parody can be protected even if it uses an original work to parody an aspect of life in general or only if it parodies
the original work itself.
26. After Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532 (9th Cir. 1956), affd per curiam sub noam. Columbia Broadcasting
Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43, reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958), in which the court declined to apply the fair
use analysis to parody, Columbia Pictures Corp. v. National Broadcasting Co., 137 F. Supp. 348, 354 (S.D. Cal. 1955)
favored the parodist by holding that a parody was entitled to fair use treatment if it took only enough to conjure up the
original work. Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541,545 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964), adopted
the "conjure up" test in holding for the parodist. Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 757 (9th Cir. 1978),
then found for the original author by holding that the parodist had copied substantially from the original work. Metro-
Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 361 (N.D. Ga. 1979), also held for the
original author by finding that the defendant's work was not a parody, while Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
19851
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This case-by-case treatment of parody tends to obscure the traditional copyright
principle that any work of authorship is worthy of protection if it contains copyright-
able subject matter and is the product of independent creation.27 Moreover, under the
fair use analysis as currently applied, a court must favor the interests of one party
over the other with little room for compromise. Over time, this approach may result
in a subtle chilling effect on the creation of parody, especially parody of a more
ambitious character. While parodists can conclude that the nature of their works may
entitle them to invoke the fair use defense, parodists also know that this defense can
prevent them from taking too much from the original work, and they have no clear
indication of how much is too much for purposes of fair use. Furthermore, parodists
cannot predict with certainty the kinds of parodies that are reasonably assured of
protection. Hence, if there is a social interest in parody, as leading courts keep
reiterating, this interest hardly is furthered when the parodists lack guidelines under
current law to reassure them that they will derive economic benefit from their works
instead of incurring liability for copyright infringement.
II. RECENT ATTEMPTS AT RESOLVING THE CONFLICT
The unsatisfactory state of the case law on parody has elicited considerable legal
commentary. 28 Three recent commentators have proposed solutions to the parody
conflict that are of particular interest.2 9 All three agree in searching for some exclu-
sive factor upon which a decision to protect parody should be made. Since each
presents a different factor that is to be given paramount effect, however, the sense of
confusion surrounding this area of the law is only intensified by their varied
approaches.
Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 747 (S.D.N.Y.), affid, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980), found that the parodist's work
was a fair use. Warner Bros., Inc. v. American Broadcasting Co., 654 F.2d 204, 211 (2d Cir. 198 1), held for the parodist
by finding no actionable infringement, but MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981), did not allow the
defense of parody under the circumstances of the case and thus held for the original author.
27. Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99, 102-03 (2d Cir. 1951).
28. See, e.g., Bernstein, Parody and Fair Use in Copyright Law, 32 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1984);
Goetsch, Parody as Free Speech-The Replacement of the Fair Use Doctrine By First Amendment Protection, 3 W. NEw
ENG. L. REV. 39 (1980); Hadl, Parody Lyrics-The "'Mad" Magazine Case, 11 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'Y. 319 (1964);
Light, Parody, Burlesque, and the Economic Rationale for Copyright, II CONN. L. REv. 615 (1979); Mummery, Parody
and Plagiarism, 116 NEw L.J. 1651 (Dec. 15, 1966); Netterville, Copyright and Tort Aspects of Parody, Mimicry and
Humorous Commentary, 35 So. CAL. L. REV. 225 (1962); Nimmer, The Law of Parody-Infringement, 3 VAL. U.L.
REv. 34 (1968); Rossett, Burlesque as Copyright Infringement, 9 COPYRIGHT LAW SYMP. (ASCAP) 1 (1958); Selvin,
Parody and Burlesque of Copyrighted Works as Infringement, 6 BULL. COPYRIGHT Soc'y. 53 (1958); Yankwich, Parody
and Burlesque in the Law of Copyright, 33 CAN. B. REv. 1130 (1955); Comment, A Copyright Quandary: Parody,
Burlesque, and the Fair Use Doctrine, 29 ALE. L. REv. 312 (1965); Comment, Legal Perils of Parody and Burlesque, 17
CLEV.-MAR. L. REV. 242 (1968); Note, Parody and Copyright Infringement, 56 COLUM. L. REv. 585 (1956); Comment,
Parody and the Law of Copyright, 29 FORDHAM L. REv. 570 (1961); Comment, Substantial Borrowing v. Fair Use, or,
Spoof with Caution, 30 Miss. L.J. 175 (1959); Note, Burlesque of Literary Property as Infringement of Copyright, 31
NOTRE DAME LAW. 46 (1955); Comment, Copyright: Burlesque and the Doctrine of Fair Use, 12 OKLA. L. REV. 276
(1959); Comment, Piracy or Parody: Never The Twain, 38 U. COLO. L. REv. 550 (1966); Comment, Parody, Copyrights
and the First Amendment, 10 U.S.F.L. REv. 564 (1976); Note, Parody and Burlesque-Fair Use or Copyright Infringe-
ment?, 12 VAND. L. REV. 459 (1959); Comment, Parody and Fair Use: The Critical Question, 57 WAsH. L. REv. 163
(1981) [hereinafter cited as Comment, Parody and Fair Use]; Comment, Parody of Copyrighted Works: Death of an Art
Form?, 4 WAYNE L. REv. 49 (1957); 56 MICH. L. REv. 1355 (1958); 23 Mo. L. REv. 80 (1958); 31 N.Y.U. L. REv. 606
(1956); 28 RoCKY MTN. L. REv. 134 (1955); 10 Sw. L.J. 68 (1956).
29. See Goetsch, supra note 28, at 57-65; Light, supra note 28, at 632-36; Comment, Parody and Fair Use, supra
note 28, at 188-91.
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Light, for example, focuses on the economic rationale behind the copyright
monopoly.30 He argues that a parody does not harm a protected interest of the original
author unless that author loses some economic benefit or suffers some disincentive to
create because of the parodist's use of the original author's work.3 1 Light contends
that an original author rarely, if ever, gains incentive to create from the possible
conveyance of the right to parody, and maintains that a parody does not compete with
the original work in any market in which the original author would expect to license
the use of his or her work.32 Light argues that unless the parody functions as a
replacement or substitute that satisfies the same market demand as that for the orig-
inal work, any harm to the original author should not be actionable under copyright
law. 3
3
This approach, which stresses the economic harm argument censured by former
Register Ladd, 34 fails to consider the possibility that a parody may provide economic
benefit to the author of the original work. Financial gain through the granting of a
license to parody arguably has not been one of the economic benefits upon which an
author has counted in the past when creating his or her work. However, the fair use
doctrine as applied thus far discourages an author from expecting economic rewards
from parody by implying that parody will often be a fair use. 35 Furthermore, the
economic rationale of copyright does not require that an author specifically predict all
financially rewarding uses of the work at the time that he or she creates it. For
example, if an author writes a successful novel, he or she can sell the movie rights to
it, which in turn may open collateral markets in everything from dolls to T-shirts.
However, the author has little expectation of benefitting from the sale of the right to
prepare such derivative works until the novel becomes a success. Copyright neverthe-
less protects the author's exclusive right to license or prepare any and all derivative
works, if and when economically feasible to do so. The treatment of parody, as a
derivative work, should begin from the same principle.
30. Congress enacted the 1976 Act, and earlier copyright acts, under its constitutional power "[t]o promote the
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8. Light summarizes the economic rationale given to justify
this monopoly as follows:
The economic justification for copyright rests on the assumption that, unless given valuable rights in his
creations, the author would not invest his labor in artistic works. This justification focuses on the societal
interest in promoting artistic creations; it is a pragmatic judgment that, without sufficient protection, authors
would cease to create and society would be deprived of their contributions.
Light, supra note 28, at 620.
31. Light, supra note 28, at 627; cf. Bernstein, supra note 28, at 39-44. Bernstein applies an economic disincentive
analysis to the problem of parody and fair use and proposes the following rle as determinative: "Any secondary work
that, in the long run, enhances the total production of art is a fair use." Id. at 44.
32. Light, supra note 28, at 633-35.
33. Id. at 634-35. Light contends that the copyright owners discussed in his article sought to protect their personal
interests or "moral rights," and not the commercial or economic interest in their works, by bringing suit against parodists.
Id. at 633. However, U.S. copyright law does not directly protect the moral rights of an author. d. at 619-20, citing
authorities. See infra note 37.
34. See Remarks of David Ladd, 24 PAT., TRADEIARK & CopYRIGrr J. (BNA) No. 593, at 21-22.
35. See supra notes 15-23 and accompanying text.
36. See most recently, the dissenting opinion in MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 191 (2d Cir. 1981) ("permis-
sible parody, whether or not in good taste, is the price an artist pays for success. ... ), and the attitude of the Second
Circuit in Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253 (2d Cir. 1980), quoted infra at note 51.
1985]
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A focus upon the market effect of parody is misplaced because a parody does not
have to serve as a market substitute for the original work before it will deprive the
original author of potential economic reward. If an author has little expectation of
financial benefit from parody today, it is largely because the legal system seems
increasingly inclined to give all of the reward to the parodist under the fair use
rationale.36 If the copyright system were to force a parodist at least to seek a license to
parody and if the original author knew that he or she might benefit financially from
such a license, there arguably would be some economic incentive to grant licenses to
prospective parodists that would weigh in the balance against any concern on the
author's part about violation of his or her "moral rights." 37
Goetsch has proposed another solution, which subdivides parody into two
categories: legal parody and non-legal parody. 38 Legal parody is defined as "any
work which imitates in a satiric manner the ideas and expression of an identifiable
previously published work." 39 This privileged category is to be taken out of copy-
right altogether and accorded absolute protection under the First Amendment. 40 In
contrast, non-legal parody, viewed as a mere copy, impersonation, or general
humorous commentary, is to be treated under the standard copyright infringement
analysis. 4 ' Goetsch further argues for a rebuttable presumption that all parodies are
legal and thus protected as free speech. 42
One problem with providing First Amendment protection to parodists in this
manner is that a property right to which the author is entitled under section 106 of the
1976 Act is confiscated without compensation and without proof that this potentially
far-reaching derogation from general principles of copyright law is necessary or
justified. This approach obliges the author to establish his or her exclusive right to the
preparation of a derivative work in the form of a parody, rather than forcing the
parodist to justify an unauthorized use of the original work on public interest grounds.
The public does have an interest in parody, but this interest does not entitle the
parodist to broadly override the author's rights in his or her work that are expressly
given by Congress.
Goetsch attempts to justify applying the First Amendment to parody by arguing
37. The "moral rights" of an author are generally defined to include the following rights:
[T]o be known as the author of his work; to prevent others from being named as the author of his work; to
prevent others from falsely attributing to him the authorship of work which he has not in fact written; to prevent
others from making deforming changes in his work; to withdraw a published work from distribution if it no
longer represents the views of the author; and to prevent others from using the work or the author's name in such
a way as to reflect on his professional standing.
2 NIMMER ON COPYRIHT, supra note 11, § 8.21[A]. United States copyright law does not expressly protect these rights,
although it indirectly does so by giving the author the exclusive right to control certain uses of his or her work. See
Leavens, In Defense of the Unauthorized Use: Recent Developments in Defending Copyright Infringement, 44 LAw &
CoNTEMP. PROas. 3, 9-10 (1981). An author may nevertheless utilize statutory rights of action under § 43 of the Lanham
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125 (1977), common law or statutory rights arising under state laws of unfair competition, and other
tort actions to defend his or her interests. The author also may protect them through contractual negotiations. See generally
2 NiMMER ON COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, § 8.21. A thorough discussion of "moral rights" is beyond the scope of this
Article.
38. Goetsch, supra note 28, at 43-44.
39. Id. at 43.
40. Id. at 60-64.
41. Id. at 45, 63.
42. Id. at 64.
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that parody is a form of critical speech that deserves better protection, as free speech,
than the author's property right to control the publication of parody. 43 His argument,
however, unduly simplifies the problem. While the First Amendment guarantees the
right to speak critically, it does not guarantee unrestricted freedom as to the manner
of critical speech to be employed, especially when that manner interferes with the
legally recognized rights of others.44 By completely removing parody from the copy-
right framework, Goetsch would give the parodist absolute rights in his or her parody
while the author is left with nothing, a result not justifiable by any objective appraisal
of the respective interests of the parties.
A student commentator advocates a third solution, which would retire the "con-
jure up" test4 5 and replace it with a "critical effect" test.46 This test requires a court
to decide, first, if the parody in question is a "true parody"; that is, one that
criticizes, in the literary sense of criticism, the work it parodies. If the answer is
affirmative, a court must then decide whether the parodist has taken more from the
parodied work than is necessary to achieve the "critical effect."' 47 The student writer
thus focuses on the fair use factor that deals with the substantiality of the taking. She
argues that since a work may be parodied by manner of performance alone, the
substantiality of the taking should not be determinative if it is necessary to take that
much for purposes of effective criticism. 48 Under her approach, as long as the taking
is necessary to achieve the critical effect, the use will be considered a fair one, and
the parodist has the burden of proving that the amount taken is necessary for the
critical effect.49
In allowing the parodist to create the best parody he or she can through a taking
of as much as is necessary to accomplish an effective criticism of the original work,
the student commentator has developed a copyright model based upon the literary
concept of parody. 50 However, in emphasizing the critical aspect of parody, she has
failed to recognize that parody serves two socially valuable functions that are in-
tertwined: entertainment and criticism. 5' She does not consider that a "humorous"
43. Id. at 62.
44. "The first amendment is not a license to trammel on legally recognized rights in intellectual property." Dallas
Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979).
45. The "conjure up" test allows a taking by the parodist of only so much as is necessary to conjure up the original
work. See supra note 19.
46. Comment, Parody and Fair Use, supra note 28, at 165.
47. Id. at 189.
48. Id. at 187-88; see 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976).
49. Comment, Parody and Fair Use, supra note 28, at 188, 190.
50. Parody enjoys a long history as a form of literary criticism. For an excellent, though technical, discussion of the
development and function of literary parody, see M. ROSE, PARODY/MErA-FicrtoN pt. 1 (1979).
51. The debate over the true value of parody to society is a longstanding one. Literary critics have recognized
parody's function as both entertainment and humor. For example, one critic has stated:
Parody is both a form of literary humor and a branch of criticism. As humor, it is probably wiser not to explain it
or attempt to rationalize it. As criticism, however, one may venture a few generalizations. For one thing, it
addresses itself not to original qualities of a work of art, but ridicules the pretentious or eccentric and helps
separate the wheat from the chaff.
THE Artic MUSE: AsamscAN WRrrERs tN PARODY 8 (R. Falk ed. 1955) [hereinafter cited as THE Arrrtc MusE].
The courts, on the other hand, while generally agreeing that parody is a valuable art worthy of protection, have
differed as to exactly what it is that makes parody valuable. Compare Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta
Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 361 (1979) (in which the court indicated that a parody must have social value
beyond its entertainment function in order to be protected) with Berlin v. E.C. Publications, Inc., 329 F.2d 541, 545 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 822 (1964) (in which the court explicitly recognized parody's value as both entertainment
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parody may be nothing more than an attempt at criticism that fails to convey its
purpose, or that the critical effect of parody is actually in the eyes of the beholder. 52
A distinction of this nature, which bases protection on the quality of the parody, goes
against the very foundation of copyright law.5 3 Furthermore, while this solution is
more attentive to the original author in that it allows free use of his or her work under
more limited circumstances, the parodist again receives all economic benefits once
the parody is found legally permissible, and the original author receives nothing for
the use of his or her work.
These commentators would solve the parody problem by treating the interests of
the parodist and the original author as irreconcilable under copyright law. The com-
mentators' solutions evidence a belief that because society has a strong interest in the
creation of parody, the law should protect society's interest by abrogating, under
qualified circumstances, the author's right to control and derive financial gain from
parodies based upon his or her original work. The weakness of this approach is that it
leaves no room for compromise; it forces an "all or nothing" solution upon conflicts
over the rights to works of parody. This "all or nothing" approach is arguably
responsible for the inconclusive case law of parody. If the courts recognized that they
could distribute some of the benefits from parodies to both authors and parodists in a
manner that would encourage the creation of parody, they might be less apt to enter
judgments influenced by subjective opinions about the quality and social desirability
of a particular parody. Indeed, the courts might find fair use more often and on more
defensible grounds than in the past. An approach that balances the interests of origi-
nal author and parodist could do much to resolve the conflicts that make the legal
status of parody so difficult to work with today.
HI. A PROPOSAL FOR COMPROMISE
The law of copyright can accommodate the interests of both original author and
parodist in a manner that furthers society's interest in parody as a valuable tool for
criticism and humor. A first step in this direction is to clarify the meaning of parody
with a view to arriving at a more workable definition. This definition then may be
used in conjunction with a fair use analysis that must in turn be refined and specifi-
cally tailored to meet the needs of cases dealing with parody.
and as a form of social and literary criticism) and Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 623 F.2d 252, 253
(2d Cir. 1980) ("in today's world of often unrelieved solemnity, copyright law should be hospitable to the humor of
parody . ")_
One recent legal commentator on parody agreed with Elsmere in arguing that when deciding to protect a parody under
copyright, no distinction should be made on the basis of whether its function is more critical or humorous. Light, supra
note 28, at 634.
52. M. RosE, supra note 50, § 1.5; see also THE ANTic MusE, supra note 51, at 15: "But the final judgment of
parody must be a subjective one. It is for the reader to decide whether [the parody] meets the main requirement-4o
brighten up the subject, illuminate the original, and provide a happy gleam of recognition or flash of acknowledgement."
53. The test of protection of a work under copyright law is independent creation, not quality or value of the work, the
latter being, by nature, a totally subjective determination. See Bleistein v. Donaldson Lithographing Co., 188 U.S. 239,
251-52 (1903); Alfred Bell & Co. v. Catalda Fine Arts, Inc., 191 F.2d 99 (2d Cir. 1951).
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A. Determining the Meaning of Parody
The major copyright cases treating the issue of parody 54 have failed to develop a
satisfactory definition of parody, and normally ignore definitional problems
altogether.5 5 These problems are not unique to the legal system. Despite the vener-
able history of parody as a form of literary expression, the task of defining it has
proved to be difficult even for scholars. A technical definition favored by one
twentieth-century literary critic, if applied by the courts, most certainly would con-
fuse the parody analysis. That critic describes parody as a particular species of
burlesque, which in turn is seen as a particular style of satire. Burlesque falls into two
categories, high and low burlesque, and each category includes two forms, one which
addresses itself to works in general and one which addresses itself to a particular work
or style. A parody is the form of high burlesque in which a particular literary work or
style is elevated by applying a "grand manner" to its "trifling themes." Travesty,
the counterpart of parody, is a form of low burlesque that deflates the "elevated
subject" of a particular work or style by treating it in a "trivial manner."- 56 While
this definition is helpful in pinning down differences in style, it reinforces the need
for judicial caution in relying upon technical concepts of parody. The resulting
distinctions in literary form are too mechanistic to advance the legal analysis of
parody very far.
Another scholar recently defined literary parody as "the critical refunctioning of
preformed literary material with comic effect." 57 She further described such parody
as making the object of its attack part of its structure; the parody, therefore, depends
in part on "the reader's conditioned reaction to this object of attack for the response
itself." ' By eliminating artificial and perhaps semantic distinctions, this definition
comes closer to the implied case law concept of parody as a comprehensive creative
form. However, it is too sweeping to illuminate the copyright analysis beyond a
certain point.
Other literary definitions, though helpful in a general way, take no account of
the unique legal doctrines at odds in the parody cases, 59 and courts may only have
confused the issues when they have attempted to utilize literary definitions in their
analyses. The literary history of parody is relevant, because it illustrates that parody
always has been controversial and susceptible to individual, subjective judgments of
54. See supra note 15.
55. An exception is Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 357
(N.D. Ga. 1979), in which the court defined parody as "a work in which the language or style of another work is closely
imitated or mimicked for comic effect or ridicule." It added a caveat, however, that if the parody is to be eligible for fair
use protection, it must make a "critical comment or statement about the original work which reflects the original
perspective of the parodist - thereby giving the parody social value beyond its entertainment function." Id.
56. D. WORCESMR, THE ART OF SATIRE 47-48 (1940).
57. M. ROSE, supra note 50, §1.7.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., G. KITCHEN, SURVEY OF BURLESQUES AND PARODY IN ENGLISH xxii (1931) ("[Plarody should be
retained as a rule for direct imitations of an individual work with humorous or critical intention."); THE AmNc MUSE,
supra note 51, at 16 (A parody is a "deflationary piece of matter and impertinency in prose or verse, of brief duration
which satirizes a literary style, personality or mannerism and provides the reader with a quiet explosion of mirth.");
SATIRE: A CRrTCAL ANTHOLOGY xxix (1967) ("In a parody a particular literary work or style is imitated and given a low
subject - with the result that the work or style itself is ridiculed along with the subject.").
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its quality. 60 However, copyright analysis requires a more objective legal definition
that avoids value judgments and that recognizes that parody may serve more than just
a critical or literary function.
The common understanding of parody as "a writing in which the language and
style of an author or work is closely imitated for comic effect or in ridicule often with
certain peculiarities greatly heightened or exaggerated,"- 6' though objective, takes no
account of the principles that underlie current copyright terminology. A more func-
tional definition of parody would preserve the historical concept of parody as a
literary form while making room for the new media of creative expression that have
developed and will continue to develop in the modem era. Such a definition should
eliminate the possibility that a verbatim performance in an incongruous setting could,
without more, qualify as parody for legal purposes. 62 It also should seek to encom-
pass the many different contexts in which parody has arisen in the case law. The
definition should be sufficiently flexible to allow for the varying forms of copyright-
able subject matter, and should diminish conflicts between technical literary concepts
of parody and the general concepts of parody that often figure in the cases.
The issues raised in the cases themselves, when read in light of the literary
analysis of parody, suggest the following definition:
A parody is a work that transforms all or a significant part of an original work of
authorship into a derivative work by distorting it or closely imitating it, for comic effect,
in a manner such that both the original work of authorship and the independent effort of
the parodist are recognizable.
The terms used in this definition correspond to concepts that are central to
copyright law and to the history of parody. "Transforms" is used to suggest the
manner in which a derivative work may be created, as expressed in the section 101
definition of "derivative work." 63 "A significant part of an original work of author-
ship" is meant to encompass situations, such as the one arising in Elsmere Music,
Inc. v. National Broadcasting Co., 64 in which a small but crucial part of a work may
be all that is needed to identify it for purposes of parody. The criterion of significance
is meant to be qualitative, not quantitative, which corresponds to an accepted in-
terpretation of "substantiality" in copyright law. 65 However, since "substantiality"
60. M. RosE, supra note 50, §§ 1.1, 1.5.
61. WEBSR's THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY 1643 (1966).
62. Thus a defendant in a case like Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397 (S.D.N.Y.
1975), which dealt with the playing of the entire Mickey Mouse March without alteration in a film depicting sexual acts,
could not qualify his or her "work" as legal parody.
63. Section 101 of the 1976 Act reads in pertinent part as follows:
A "derivative work" is a work based upon one or more preexisting works, such as a translation, musical
arrangement, dramatization, fictionalization, motion picture version, sound recording, art reproduction, abridg-
ment, condensation, or any other form in which a work may be recast, transformed, or adapted. A work
consisting of editorial revisions, annotations, elaborations, or other modifications which, as a whole, represent
an original work of authorship, is a "derivative work."
17 U.S.C. § 101 (1976).
64. 482 F. Supp. 741 (S.D.N.Y.), affd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980). The district court held in this case that the
defendant's use in a television skit of a phrase of the plaintiff's song containing four words, with nearly identical lyrics,
was a "taking of a substantial nature." Id. at 744..
65. The meaning to be given "substantiality" and "substantial similarity" in copyright law has been a controversial
issue. Courts have argued for both qualitative and quantitative interpretations. However, ample support exists for the
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also has been viewed as a quantitative test, the term "significant" is preferred in
order to avoid any confusion in interpretation.
"Derivative work" should be understood to have the meaning accorded it under
section 101, which thus links parody to the scheme of protection given such works
under the 1976 Act. 6 6 "Distorting," which could be read to mean "subtly distort-
ing," is chosen because a parody, as traditionally understood, does not make great
changes in the work it parodies; parody demands that the original work be
recognizable. 67 "Closely imitating" is meant to dispel the idea that verbatim copying
is parody permissible for copyright purposes, but it should be understood that virtual-
ly any taking short of verbatim copying can be parody for legal purposes. 68
In specifying that the enumerated uses of the original work should be "for comic
effect," the intent is not that the parody be judged by the extent to which it suc-
cessfully accomplishes this effect. Rather, this phrase requires that "comic effect"
be part of the parodist's intended purpose in creating the parody. Parody's comic
effect is the means to achieving parody's critical function, 69 and for this reason the
concept of criticism does not need to be included expressly in the proposed definition.
"Independent effort of the parodist" requires that the parodist show that he or
she has made an individual contribution to the creation of the parody. The quantum of
creative effort required to satisfy this standard is to be determined by traditional
copyright concepts of independent creation in derivative works.7 ° Finally, in requir-
ing that both the original, underlying work and the independent effort of the parodist
be "recognizable," the definition does not imply that they must be separately
identifiable. This standard would be satisfied if the ordinary observer, 71 comparing
the original work or portion of it with the parody, could distinguish one from the
other.
The definition proposed above is meant to apply regardless of whether the
parody focuses mainly on the work parodied or uses the work parodied to focus
interpretation of "substantiality" as a qualitative test, and this Article accepts that test as controlling. See, e.g., Sid &
Marty Krofft Television Prods., Inc. v. McDonald's Corp., 562 F.2d 1157, 1164 (9th Cir. 1977); Roth Greeting Cards v.
United Card Co., 429 F.2d 1106, 1110 (9th Cir. 1970). For a useful discussion of this issue, see 3 Ni MEt ON
COPYRIGHT, supra note 11, §§ 13.03[A][21, 13.05[A][3).
66. See supra note 63. The author of a derivative work receives copyright protection of the portion of the work that
he or she created, as long as his or her use of the preexisting material in the derivative work was lawful. 17 U.S.C. § 103
(1976).
67. M. RosE, supra note 50, § 1.5.
68. By qualifying the literary view of parody as "imitating," see id. § 1.2, with the word "closely," this element
supports the concept implied in Benny v. Loew's, Inc., 239 F.2d 532, 536 (9th Cir. 1956), aoffd per curiam sub nom.
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. Loew's, Inc., 356 U.S. 43, reh'g denied, 356 U.S. 934 (1958), that a verbatim
copying exceeds the scope of fair use. The proposed definition requires that verbatim copying not be permitted unless it is
de minimis; the definition differs from Benny, however, in allowing a substantial or nearly verbatim copying to qualify as
protected parody if all other criteria are met. Thus a parodist is less limited in his or her ability to create the "best parody"
than under prior doctrines. For an example of prior doctrines, see Walt Disney Prods. v. Air Pirates, 581 F.2d 751, 758
(9th Cir. 1978) (denying defendant the right to make the "best parody" in an attempt to balance the interests of original
author and parodist).
69. M. RosE, supra note 50, § 1.3.
70. Independent creation in derivative works must generally involve more than a minimal contribution by the author
of the derivative work. See Durham Indus., Inc., v. Tomy Corp., 630 F.2d 905, 909 (2d Cir. 1980); L. Batlin & Son, Inc.
v. Snyder, 536 F.2d 486, 490 (2d Cir. 1976); I NtaMER ON CoPYRtGrr, supra note 11, § 3.03.
71. The "ordinary observer" is generally understood in copyright law to mean the reasonable person or reasonable
member of the audience to which the work in question is directed. 3 NmMER ON CoPYtoRH, supra note 11, § 13.03[E].
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attention on aspects of life in general or on social criticism.7 2 The form of the work is
what makes it a parody here, and neither its focus nor its degree of success in
accomplishing its purpose is to be considered in determining whether the work in
question is a parody. The parodist is meant to have the burden of proof in establishing
that his or her work fits this threshold definition of parody.
B. Sharing the Economic Benefits of Parody
1. Limits of Section 107 Fair Use as Currently Applied
While a functional definition, such as the one proposed in this Article, would
enable a court to identify the elements of parody more clearly and to base its remain-
ing decisions upon objective factors, such a definition must be used in conjunction
with a more refined analysis of fair use than is customary at the present time. Despite
the difficulties engendered by the fair use doctrine, fair use offers the greatest oppor-
tunities for developing an approach to parody that can balance the interests of all of
the parties concerned within the philosophical framework underlying the copyright
system.7 3
However, fair use must be tailored to fit the specific needs of parody. The four
fair use factors codified in section 10774 are not enough to resolve the unique prob-
lems of parody. Under the first factor, "the purpose and character of the use," 75
parody can claim a presumption of social value, since it seeks to criticize or entertain
or to do both. Yet virtually all of the parodies that have been the subject of litigation
to date have been of a commercial nature. As commercial works, their claim to the
fair use privilege is weaker than it would be if they were works of a nonprofit or
educational nature. Probably most disputed cases will continue to involve a use of a
commercial nature, which weighs against the parodist's ability to prove fair use.
The function of the second factor, the "nature of the copyrighted work," 76 is
72. Several of the courts treating parody have been concerned with the question of whether a parody must specific-
ally parody the work from which it is derived or need only use that work to parody aspects of life or society. For example,
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc. v. Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351 (N.D. Ga. 1979), held that if a
parody is to warrant protection under fair use, "it should parody that part of the original work which it copies." Id. at 360.
If it closely parallels an entire work, "it should parody at least a majority of those parts or elements of the original work
which it parallels." Id. Walt Disney Prods. v. Mature Pictures Corp., 389 F. Supp. 1397, 1398 (S.D.N.Y. 1975) denied
fair use to a defendant who played an unaltered version of the Mickey Mouse March in an incongruous setting allegedly to
parody the mores of society. MCA, Inc. v. Wilson, 677 F.2d 180, 185 (2d Cir. 1981), resolved the debate by holding:
-[A] permissible parody need not be directed solely to the copyrighted song but may also reflect on life in general.
However, if the copyrighted song is not at least in part an object of the parody, there is no need to conjure it up."
The better view, and the one adopted in this Article, is that a parodist should not be required to parody the original
work utilized in the parody in order to claim fair use under copyright law. See Elsmere Music, Inc. v. National
Broadcasting Co., 482 F. Supp. 741, 746 (S.D.N.Y.), aff'd, 623 F.2d 252 (2d Cir. 1980) ("the issue to be resolved by a
court is whether the use in question is a valid satire or parody, and not whether it is a parody of the copied song itself").
73. This approach, therefore, must serve the economic rationale underlying copyright by protecting the financial
incentives given to all artists in order to inspire creativity, Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954), and need not
concern itself with the protection of personal, or moral, rights.
74. See supra note 13.
75. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1976).
76. Id. § 107(2).
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unclear. It has been interpreted as permitting a finding of fair use more readily in
cases dealing with informational works than in those dealing with works of a creative
or entertaining nature.77 If this interpretation is accepted, it will weigh against the
parodist, because parodies are usually derived from creative, not informational,
works. The nature of the original work also is pertinent to how the parody is to be
accomplished. For example, if the original work is a poster, a parody of it will be
accomplished in a different manner from a parody of a song, because of the differ-
ence in media employed. Whether the original work is itself of a commercial or a
nonprofit, educational nature is not an express consideration under this factor, and in
any case, should not determine the treatment of the parody as such. The first two
factors found in section 107 thus provide some guidelines for the treatment of parody,
but these factors do not clearly tip the scales for either party.
The third factor, "the amount and substantiality of the portion used," 78 weighs
in favor of the original author. In using as much of the original work as is necessary to
evoke its image, the parodist's use always will be substantial. However, the fourth
factor, "the effect of the use upon the potential market" for the original work,
79
favors the parodist, because a parody almost never would serve as a substitute for the
original work. 80 A parody may satisfy curiosity about the original work so that sales
of the original work decrease and financial gain thereby is lessened. Parody may
instead increase demand for the original, and in this way increase financial gain.
However, parody almost never will serve as a direct market substitute. The end result
is that, if weighted equally, the third and fourth factors of the fair use analysis tend to
cancel each other out. A court trying to apply section 107 to parody thus may be left
with no operative basis of decision unless it gives disproportionate weight to one of
the four factors.
While none of the four factors, as currently interpreted, should be decisive in
cases of parody without more, section 107 leaves room for the application of addi-
tional factors in making a determination of fair use.8t The adoption of two new fair
use criteria, good faith and reasonable royalties, therefore is recommended for use
specifically in cases dealing with parody in order to aid the courts in balancing the
interests of the original author and the parodist.
77. 3 NitrmE ON CoPYRICGHT, supra note 11, § 13.05[A]12] . See specifically Universal City Studios, Inc. v. Sony
Corp. of Am., 659 F.2d 963, 972 (9th Cir. 1981), rev'd on other grounds, 104 S. Ct. 774, reh'g denied, 104 S. Ct. 1619
(1984). The majority opinion of the Supreme Court does not discuss the second fair use factor, however, the dissenting
opinion is in accord with the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the application of this fair use factor. Id. at 625-26.
78. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1976).
79. Id. § 107(4).
80. Because parody, through distortion or close imitation of a work, attempts to achieve a comic and thus critical
effect, it serves a different purpose from that of the original work itself. Parody rarely comes so close to the original work
that it serves the same function, in the audience's perception, as the original work. But cf. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer v.
Showcase Atlanta Coop. Prods., Inc., 479 F. Supp. 351, 362 (N.D. Ga. 1979) (holding that the defendant's musical
entitled "Scarlett Fever," though not a parody under the court's definition, was likely to harm the potential market for the
plaintiff's derivative use of its movie "Gone With The Wind" as a theatrical adaptation).
81. In determining fair use, § 107 states that the factors to be considered shall include the four factors set forth in its
text. Under § 101 of the 1976 Act, the term "including" is "illustrative and not limitative." Therefore, a court has the
discretion to consider additional factors not set forth in § 107 if it deems them relevant to a consideration of fair use.
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2. Augmenting Section 107 with Additional Factors
a. Good Faith
In parody cases, the concept of fair use should not be applied without subjecting
the parodist to a test of good faith. A "good faith" requirement in this context is
comprised of two elements. As a threshold step, the court should require the parodist
to show that he or she actually intended to create a parody at some point during the
elaboration of the new work. If the definition of parody proposed in this Article is
met, the parodist would have established a presumption that he or she intended to
create a parody. s2 However, the original author should have the opportunity to rebut
this presumption. Such an opportunity would cover the situation that arose in MCA,
Inc. v. Wilson,83 in which a work very similar to that of another author was belatedly
labelled a parody after completion in an attempt to excuse it from copyright in-
fringement.8 4
A second element of good faith should require the parodist to show that he or she
made a reasonable attempt to obtain consent to parody from the original author or the
relevant copyright owner. Under section 106 of the 1976 Act, consent to use anoth-
er's work is normally mandatory unless excused by fair use under section 107.85 In
the case of parody, an intervening step is necessary to prevent the parodist from
bypassing the author in the expectation that fair use, if available, will automatically
excuse the need for consent. Rather, in parody cases, the parodist should be formally
obliged to deal with the author before asking the court to provide shelter within the
fair use doctrine. Such a shelter may be rendered unnecessary or even unavailable if
the author of the underlying work can demonstrate a willingness to have licensed the
parody on reasonable terms. The presumption that certain authors would not consent
to being parodied should not obscure the probability that many others would regard
the commercial rewards from this kind of derivative work with interest and would
prefer to negotiate conditions that would reward them financially while protecting
their personal interests.
82. The proposed definition establishes criteria that are indicative of intent to parody by requiring the parodist to
prove an intention to create "comic effect" and to prove his or her "independent effort." See supra text accompanying
notes 69-71.
83. 677 F.2d 180 (2d Cir. 1981).
84. The defendant in MCA testified that he did not intend his work to be a burlesque or satire (the equivalent of
parody in this article) at the time that he wrote it. It was during rehearsal that he formed the intent to use his composition as
a burlesque. The court obviously gave weight to this factor in making the following decision:
We are not prepared to hold that a commercial composer can plagiarize a competitor's copyrighted song,
substitute dirty lyrics of his own, perform it for commercial gain, and then escape liability by calling the end
result a parody or satire on the mores of society. Such a holding would be an open-ended invitation to musical
plagiarism. \Ve conclude that defendants did not make fair use of plaintiff's song.
Id. at 185. See also Dallas Cowboys Cheerleaders, Inc. v. Scoreboard Posters, Inc., 600 F.2d 1184, 1188 (5th Cir. 1979)
and Pillsbury Co. v. Milky Way Prods., Inc., 215 U.S.P.Q. 124, 129 (N.D. Ga. 1981), in which the courts refused to
consider the defendants' claims of parody under fair use when the defendants had presented no evidence to justify calling
their work a parody.
85. Because the author has the exclusive right to prepare derivative works under 17 U.S.C. § 106(2) (1976), a
parodist's unauthorized use is infringement under 17 U.S.C. § 501(a) (1976) ("Anyone who violates any of the exclusive
rights of the copyright owner . . . is an infringer of the copyright."), unless fair use is found under 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1976) ("the fair use of a copyrighted work.., is not an infringement of copyright").
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If the parodist does request consent and the original author agrees to give it only
if he or she receives payment for the use, the court should consider whether the terms
of the agreement proposed by the original author were reasonable under the circum-
stances. If the parodist refused to enter into an agreement deemed reasonable by the
court, this action may be construed as an unreasonable attempt to obtain consent. If,
instead, the original author refused consent despite efforts to obtain it, a court should
consider the reasonableness of this refusal principally from a commercial perspective.
Declining an otherwise commercially valid proposal looks like an attempt to prevent
parody. If consent to parody is withheld for reasons that look suspiciously like an
attempt to protect "moral rights," United States courts need not be unduly sympa-
thetic to the original author in the absence of statutory protection of such rights.
If the parodist is unable to obtain consent to parody, whether resulting from the
original author's choosing to stand upon his or her exclusive rights under section 106
despite the parodist's commercially reasonable offer or for some other reason beyond
the parodist's control, then the parodist should not be denied the legal right to parody.
However, he or she must give something to the author in exchange for this right,
which leads to the concept of reasonable compensation.
b. Reasonable Royalties
The second criterion proposed for the administration of the fair use doctrine in
parody cases would require the showing of payment, or an offer of payment, 86 by the
parodist to the original author, of a reasonable royalty based upon a percentage of the
net profit that the parodist derives from exploitation of his or her parody.87 A court in
86. In some instances, if a parodist's good faith offer to pay royalties was refused by the author, a court may
consider that offer as enough to satisfy the second criterion proposed here. However, it is preferable that the parodist
escrow royalties on the author's behalf if the parodist is unable to make direct payment to the author. See infra note 89.
87. The concept of payment for fair use is not new in copyright law. Timberg has proposed requiring the user of the
original work of authorship to compensate the original author for his or her "fair use" if the use is economically
profitable, if the use does economic harm to the copyright owner, and if the user is able to pay compensation. Timberg, A
Modernized Fair Use Code for the Electronic as Well as the Gutenberg Age, 75 Nw. U.L. REv. 193, 236 (1980); see also
Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 30
J. COPYRIGHT Soc'y 253, 281-83 (1983) (discussing reasonable royalties as an alternative to fair use and as a cure for
market failure); Bernstein, supra note 28, at 43 (considering a type of compulsory licensing scheme which would
compensate a copyright owner for economic harm suffered at the hands of a "secondary user"). Furthermore, at least one
court has considered the defendant's offer to pay a reasonable royalty, in the form of all profits, to the plaintiff for use of
his or her work in arriving at a finding of fair use. See Time Inc. v. Bernard Geis Assocs., 293 F. Supp. 130, 146
(S.D.N.Y. 1968).
In addition, two current laws governing intellectual property provide for the payment of reasonable royalties, under
certain circumstances, for an unauthorized or infringing use. Section 907 of the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of
1984, Pub. L. No. 98-620, 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 3347, 3351-52 (to be codified at 17 U.S.C.
§ 907), provides for payment of a reasonable royalty by "innocent purchasers" of a protected work as an alternative to
court-awarded damages. Though the Semiconductor Chip Protection Act of 1984 creates a sui generis form of intellectual
property right, similar versions, f protective legislation for semiconductor chips were proposed as amendments to the
1976 Act, and the final version as signed into law is based in many respects upon copyright principles of protection. H.R.
REt. No. 781, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 5-11, reprinted in 1984 U.S. CODE CONo. & AD. NEWS 5750, 5754-60. The
reasonable royalty alternative created by § 907 requires that an innocent purchaser (one who acted in good faith without
notice that the semiconductor chip product purchased was protected by the owner's exclusive right to reproduce or
distribute the mask work embodied in the semiconductor chip product) pay a reasonable royalty, the amount of which is to
be determined by voluntary negotiation, to the owner of the mask work or be subject to court-awarded damages for
infringement. 1984 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws (98 Stat.) 3347, 3351-52. Compare § 511 of an earlier version,
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such a case may allow the parodist to show payment in one of two ways. The parodist
could simply send periodic payments to the original author, after verifying that the
latter is indeed the copyright owner. If the original author accepts them, he or she
should not be deemed to have waived any right to a cause of action that he or she
would otherwise have under the copyright statutes or other laws that protect an
original author's moral rights or economic interests. 88 If the original author later
brings suit against the parodist for copyright infringement and prevails, the parodist
should be entitled to either a set-off for any nominal, actual or statutory damages
awarded, plus costs and attorney fees, or recoupment, where an injunction is granted
or where there is overpayment. Should the parodist be unable to send payment
directly to the original author, through no fault of his or her own, 89 the escrow of the
payments pending resolution of any technical problems or disputes should satisfy the
requirement of payment.
In determining how reasonable is reasonable, 90 a parodist may first look to
industry standards. If he or she can find direct evidence of what normally would be
acceptable in negotiating licenses between parodists and original authors, taking into
account the type of use to be made of the parody, 91 and if the parodist then bases the
royalty upon these standards, it should be deemed reasonable by the court. However,
this sort of evidence is not likely to be abundant until and unless courts insist on direct
negotiations as a pre-condition to a claim of fair use, as this Article proposes. When
industry standards do not exist or are indeterminable, a good faith belief that the rate
actually chosen was reasonable under the circumstances should be enough to satisfy
this standard, if not rebutted by other evidence.
proposed by the U.S. Senate, of legislation protecting semiconductor chips for a slightly different treatment of the
payment of reasonable royalties by innocent purchasers. S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 35-36 (1984). Another
law, 28 U.S.C. § 1498 (1982), requires the U.S. government to pay "reasonable and entire compensation" to the owner
of a patent or copyright as damages for infringing upon the patent or copyright. This statutory remedy is "generally
equated to a 'reasonable royalty."' S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1984) (citing Decca Ltd. v. United States,
640 F.2d 1156 (Ct. Cl. 1980) and Leesona Corp. v. United States, 599 F.2d 958 (Ct. Cl.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 991
(1979)).
88. The Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1127 (1977), for example, protects against trademark infringement and
unfair competition, and it is not preempted by the 1976 Act. See 17 U.S.C. § 301(d) (1976). States may have also enacted
or developed through their judicial systems laws protecting rights to privacy and resale of certain types of artistic works
and laws against unfair competition.
89. The parodist may be "unable" to make payment to the author for any one of several reasons. The author may
refuse any payments sent to him or her by the parodist in the belief that he or she is preserving all rights to sue for
infringement by doing so or for other reasons. The parodist may be unable to determine with certainty the identity or
location of the copyright owner. The parodist might also, in good faith, believe that sending payments directly to the
original author or copyright owner is unwise, as in the case where litigation over the parody is threatened or has already
been instigated.
90. "How reasonable" refers to determining what percentage of net profit is reasonable under the circumstances.
This provision is similar to the customary standard for "reasonable royalties" considered by the Senate in connection with
proposed legislation protecting semiconductor chips:
The question of what constitutes a "reasonable" royalty for the chip is a matter, in part, of the equities of the
user; and in part, a more objective question-usually posed as what a "willing purchaser" would pay a "willing
seller" if they negotiated a license in good faith.
S. REP. No. 425, 98th Cong., 2d Sess. 25 (1984) (citing Horvath v. McCord Radiator & Mfg. Co., 100 F.2d 326 (6th Cir.
1938) (construing 35 U.S.C. § 284 (1984), which grants damages for infringement to a patentee of no less than a
reasonable royalty)).
91. "Type of use" affects the reasonableness of the royalty rate to be charged. If a parody takes the form of a movie
to be distributed nationally as a popular release, the returns from it will certainly be potentially greater than those from a
parody of a more intellectual work of fiction that addresses a narrow audience. Thus the parodist may properly consider
the nature of his parody when determining a reasonable royalty.
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The royalty percentage should be based upon net, instead of gross, profit so that
the parodist and original author share in the actual profits, exclusive of expenses. As
set forth in section 504(b) of the 1976 Act,92 in any disputed action the original author
should be asked to present proof only of the parodist's gross revenues from the
parody and the parodist should be required to prove his or her deductible expenses. If
a court finds that the royalty rate was chosen in good faith but is unreasonable, it may
make a finding of fair use conditional upon the payment of a different rate. The court
also may require continued payment of the royalty as a condition to the prolonged use
of the original work without consent, in order to protect the original author's rights
should the parodist attempt to terminate payment after a finding of fair use is made.
Finally, if the parody makes no profit, then no royalty payment can be or need be
made to the original author.
93
IV. COMPETING INTERESTS IN BALANCE
Recourse to reasonable royalties in parody cases would foster recognition of the
principle that when a legal right is taken from the original author and no overwhelm-
ing public interest in taking it is shown, he or she should be compensated for the use
if the user profits from it. 94 Although parody has a long and venerable history, its
value to society is not such as to justify an absolute taking of the original author's
property right in his or her creative work. Reasonable royalties permit a compromise
to be made. If a court is satisfied that a parodist has in good faith created a parody, it
may invoke the fair use doctrine to limit the original author's right to control this
particular use of his or her work. However, by requiring reasonable royalties, the
same court ensures that the author will share in the economic benefits from parody, if
the parody is profitable. Such benefits are ones that the author very likely would not
otherwise have obtained, in view of the unclear status of the author's rights concern-
ing works of parody under current law. In making the payment of reasonable royalties
a prerequisite to the finding of fair use, the original author could receive payment
without obliging a court to reach a decision on the infringement issue, which other-
wise might render the parodist's use unlawful and deny the parodist copyright protec-
tion of his or her own work, 95 therefore undermining the parodist's incentive to create
parody.
92. Section 504(b) reads in pertinent part: "In establishing the infringer's profits, the copyright owner is required to
present proof only of the infringer's gross revenue, and the infringer is required to prove his or her deductible expenses
and the elements of profit attributable to factors other than the copyrighted work." 17 U.S.C. § 504(b) (1976).
93. Some practical concerns in implementing the criterion of payment of reasonable royalties should be noted. A
notice problem exists because this solution is a judicial, as opposed to a statutory, one. A parodist therefore has no idea
that he or she must pay, offer to pay, or escrow royalties in order to prevail under this proposed fair use analysis until a
case on point is decided. In establishing a new practice, courts should be flexible in providing for the payment of
reasonable royalties after the fact as a condition to a finding of fair use, once the proposed definition of parody and the
tests of good faith are met.
94. It should be emphasized that the payment of reasonable royalties is not proposed as a type of provision for
damages. Payment does not depend upon whether the author suffers economic harm through the use of his or her work by
a parodist. Reasonable royalties simply recognize the author's potentially valuable property right in his or her original
work in an attempt to give both author and parodist economic reward from their creations.
95. 17 U.S.C. § 103 (1976).
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The reasonable royalty approach has a further advantage in that it indirectly
resolves the question of the value to society of the particular parody in question. If a
parodist creates a serious literary or critical parody from an original work, the com-
mercial rewards normally will not be large and the parodist will receive little financial
gain from it, if any at all. In this event, the original author is discouraged from suing
for infringement because, if the derivative work meets the test for legal parody
suggested in this Article, all that the original iuthor could recover would be reason-
able royalties. Such royalties probably would not even cover the cost of the suit.
Parodies for select audiences based on serious intellectual endeavors thus remain
protected and encouraged. If a parody provides no financial gain to the parodist, the
parodist need not fear a claim for payment by the original author. In contrast, when a
more commercial parody is created, especially when it is based upon works that have
become popular successes, mandating payment of reasonable royalties ensures that
the original author receives financial benefit from the use of his or her work.
Adopting this approach has several other advantages. It encourages the parties to
negotiate licenses directly. If the parodist and the original author know that the courts
favor a balancing of their interests in this manner, they may be persuaded to com-
promise on their own and thus resolve their differences around the negotiating table
instead of in the courtroom. In this spirit, moreover, the original author and parodist
may come to mutually acceptable determinations regarding the preservation of the
original author's moral rights, which otherwise are not recognized in the 1976 Act.
The concept of requiring payment based upon net profit in parody cases also helps to
resolve the First Amendment implications in this area. 9 6 The requirement of good
faith and the threat of reasonable royalties, in the absence of negotiated royalties, do
not prevent the parodist from parodying. However, they do require the parodist to
share any profit that he or she makes when the parody is found to constitute a fair use
in derogation of the original author's exclusive rights.
The conflict that parody creates in determining whose interest, author's or
parodist's, should be protected under copyright law thus does not have to be resolved
completely in favor of one party or the other. Society has an interest in protecting
both the parodist and the original author, each of whom can make valuable contribu-
tions to the progress of the arts. The copyright system can protect the interests of both
parties by incorporating the concepts of good faith and reasonable royalties into the
fair use analysis. This approach benefits society because parody is encouraged,
regardless of whether it is more critical or more entertaining in its effect, and because
the parodist and original author are encouraged to negotiate and resolve their dif-
ferences privately, instead of through the court system. Although this approach does
not solve all of the difficulties that parody creates for copyright law, it does balance
96. The required payment is implicitly based on ability to pay, because the parodist must compensate the author only
if the parodist derives a net profit from his or her use. Nevertheless, the parodist has the freedom to parody without fear of
liability for infringement, as long as he or she meets the other proposed criteria. For a view that requiring compensation
for fair use does not necessarily compromise First Amendment rights of free speech, as long as the remuneration is
compensatory as opposed to penal, see Comment, Copyright Infringement and the First Amendment, 79 CoLuM. L. REv.
320 (1979).
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the interests of those who have the greatest effect on the creation of parody, the
original author and the parodist. Only by balancing these competing interests will the
kind of compromise be struck that will encourage the vitality of parody under United
States copyright law.

